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Abstract— Many multilevel security relational models have been 
proposed and different models offer different advantages. In this 
paper, we adapt and refine some of the best ideas from these 
models and add new ones of own to extend our Multilevel 
Security with Key-polyinstantiation (MLSK) relational model. 
MLSK now supports relational algebra and user lattice 
manipulations while ensuring that the soundness, completeness 
and security that it originally guaranteed are not compromised. 
We also implement MLSK in a non-relational scenario, thereby 
demonstrating the extensibility of the model to other 
environments. 
 
Index Terms—Multilevel Security, Key-polyinstantiation, LBAC 
operations, Non-relational Implementation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In multilevel security there is a hierarchy of users or user-
levels1, in which each user has its own version of information. 
A user can see all the information belonging to him and to 
users below his level. On the other hand, information 
belonging to a higher user, or even existence of such 
information or such user-levels, is hidden from lower user-
levels. A model for a multilevel security database must be 
devoid of covert channels that can compromise of user 
confidentiality. 
Existing multilevel secure (MLS) data models support u-
polyinstantiation2 [4, 6, 8, 12, 15, 16]. These have been 
defined for relational databases and have semantics very 
similar to SQL. They also have the potential to be 
implemented using SQL, although no such implementation 
appears to have been carried out.  
It is important for a model to support key-polyinstantiation3 
because in the real world it is often the case [3] that an object 
varies in its key value(s) when it occurs in the beliefs of 
different users. Thus a unique key across beliefs limits our 
 
 
1
 We use both terms user and user-level interchangeably in this paper when 
the meaning is apparent from the context. 
2
 Under u-polyinstantiation it is assumed that a real world object has the 
same key under beliefs of all users that can access the object, although non-
key values may vary. 
3
 Key-polyinstantiation allows key as well as non-key attributes to vary 
across user beliefs. 
ability to accurately model the real world and any model that 
supports key-polyinstantiation is able to provide a more 
accurate and unambiguous representation of real world data.  
Our earlier work was a first attempt at defining a model for a 
multi-level secure relational database that supports key-
polyinstantiation and whose statements have semantics closely 
resembling SQL[5] 
This time we focus on making this model more 
comprehensive and we extend it to include: 
1. Relational algebra operations 
2. Operations for user lattice manipulations 
3. Incremental mapping of lattice operations in role 
based access control systems 
4. A non-relational implementation using XML 
 
Addition of relational algebra operations extends the usability 
of the model. Allowing for lattice manipulations frees the 
model of the current unrealistic assumption of a fixed user set 
with an unchanging hierarchy and with our non-relational 
implementation we demonstrate that users can utilize this 
model and capitalize on its benefits even in a non-relational 
environment. This makes our model the first in its class to 
support both relational and non-relational implementation 
preferences.  
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Lattice-based access control models such as ours can be 
implemented in a role-based environment by generating every 
state of the role based model from the corresponding state of 
the lattice [13]. We attempted to define incremental operations 
for a role based model corresponding to our lattice 
manipulation operations, but found that any such incremental 
attempt cannot guarantee security and is hence infeasible. 
In the following section we summarize existing research. In 
Section 3, we extend our MLS-K model to include relational 
algebra operations. In Section 4 we define lattice manipulation 
operations and explain why an incremental effort to modify 
the corresponding role-based system is infeasible. Section 5 
provides an overview of the implementation4 and describes 
the schema manipulation required for XML to support the 
model. In Section 6 we evaluate the performance of our 
implementation. Then we conclude with a summary of our 
model and areas for future work and cite references. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Most of the existing MLS data models support only u-
polyinstantiation [4, 6, 8, 12, 15, 16]. These have been defined 
for relational databases and have semantics similar to SQL. 
They support various integrity constraints and ensure 
enforcement of the ‘read-down and write up’ policy.  They 
also have the potential to be implemented in SQL, although no 
such implementation appears to have been carried out. 
The only known model that supports key-polyinstantiation 
was proposed by [2, 3]. This model was defined for temporal 
and spatial databases but it also supports the relational model 
and it was the first work to introduce the concept of anchors. 
But work on this model largely remains incomplete – no 
operational semantics or implementation has been specified. 
The first work to support key-polyinstantiation was our 
unpublished report on the MLSK model. In MLSK, as in any 
 
4
 This is a basic implementation to prove the feasibility of implementing 
the relational model in a non-relational scenario. No attempt has been made to 
optimize performance. 
multilevel security environment, the user-levels form a fixed 
hierarchy where every user has its own object space. We 
assume that each object is uniquely identified by its key 
values in a given object space; although an object can have 
different keys when viewed in the object space of different 
users.  
Information available to a user consists of the following: 
1. The object space which is the user’s belief about which 
objects exist in the real world 
2. Property values of objects in the user’s object space 
3. Knowledge of which object in user’s object space is 
known to a lower user, possibly with different identity (key) 
and attribute values 
 
The formal semantics of the MLS-K data model are: 
1. The structure of the model can be represented in a form 
of the security hierarchy of users where user-levels are 
partially ordered in lattice 
2. Each user is assigned a security classification (or 
classification) which defines what data is visible to this 
user5 
3. The relation schema is:  R(OC,OO, BC,BO, A1, C1, A2, 
C2, …, Ak, Ck) where   
OC- owner classification is the security classification 
of the tuple owner 
OO- owner object is the object key (could be multiple 
attributes) as believed by the tuple owner. 
BC- belief classification is the security classification 
of the relation owner 
BO-belief object is the object key (could be multiple 
attributes) as believed by the relation owner 
Ai –data attribute over domain Di 
Ci –classification attribute for Ai. The domain of Ci is 
specified by a set {Li..Hi} containing all security 
classifications ranging from Li up to Hi (Li < Hi ≤ 
OC) 
Its interpretation is: 
1. Objects are believed by δ-user6 to exist if t[OC,OO] = 
t[BC,BO] 
2. Objects are accepted if t[OC,OO] ≠ t[BC,BO]. We say 
δ-user believes that an object OO is known to BC-user 
as object BO. And we say that the data (attributes) of 
object BO is accepted by δ-user  
3. Objects are not accepted by a user if they are neither 
believed nor accepted  
A user’s belief comprises of all objects that have been 
believed and accepted by the user. 
III. THE ENHANCED MLSK MODEL 
 We define for our model the 6 basic operations available in 
relational algebra: 
1. Selection 
 
5
 We use the user-level as the security classification although this is not 
mandatory.  
6
 Note that δ is not a user in our hierarchy and when we use this notation 
we mean that this property is valid for the current user who could be at any 
level in the hierarchy i.e. δ can be  µ, α, β or λ as needed.  
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2. Projection 
3. Union 
4. Intersection 
5. Difference 
6. Cross-product 
7. Joins 
For all operations we use the following: 
1. R1, R2 , R3, R4 –relations on which the operations are 
performed 
2. R - the resulting relation  
3. t1, t2 t3, t4 – tuples of relations R1, R2, R3, R4, 
respectively  
4. t - tuple of relation R 
5. R = σ oc<= δ (R1 op R2), where op is any relational 
operation performed by a δ-user 
 
Selection (σ) and Projection (pi) operators are defined exactly 
as in classical relational algebra. Selection allows extracting 
rows from the relation while projection extracts columns.  
 
To perform the Union, Intersection and Difference relations, 
R1 and R2 have to be union-compatible i.e. they have the same 
number of attributes and corresponding attributes (from left to 
right) have the same domain. The resulting relation R has 
schema identical to schema of R1 and it inherits attribute 
names from R1. 
 
To illustrate these operations for user α we will consider the 
following relation instances: 
Table 1- R1 
OC OO BC BO Age C1 
α Tom        λ Hari   35 α 
λ Ron λ Ron 54 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ 
Table 3-R2 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
C1 
α Tom       α Tom             35 α 
α Tom       λ Hari   39 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ 
 
Table 4-R3 
OC OO BC BO Salary C1 
α Tom        λ Hari   80 λ 
λ Ron λ Ron 54 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   80 λ 
 
Table 5-R4 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
C1 
α Tom       α Tom             35 α 
α Tom       λ Hari   39 λ 
λ Ron λ Ron 40 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ 
Table 6- σ oc<= α (R1 ∪R2) 
 
OC OO BC BO Age C1 
α Tom        λ Hari   35 α 
λ Ron λ Ron 54 λ 
α Tom        α Tom            35 α 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ 
Union of R1, R2 denoted R1 ∪R2 is the set of tuples that are in 
R1, R2 or both i.e. ∀ t1∈ R1 , t2∈ R2 ∃ t ∈ R such that t1=t ∨ 
t2=t. 
Intersection of R1, R2 denoted R1 ∩R2 is the set of tuples that 
are in both R1 and R2 i.e. ∀ t1∈ R1 Λ t2∈ R2 such that t1= t2, ∃ 
t ∈ R such that t = t2. 
Table 7- σ oc<=α  (R1∩ R2) 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
C1 
α Tom       λ Hari   39 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ 
 
 
Difference of R1, R2 denoted R1 - R2 is the set of tuples that are 
in R1 but not in R2 i.e. ∀ t1∈R1, such that t1 ≠ t2 for any t2 ∈R2,  
∃ t∈ R such that t = t1  
 
Table 8- σ oc<=α  (R1- R2) 
OC OO BC BO Age C1 
λ Ron λ Ron 54 λ 
 
 
Cross-product of R1, R2, denoted R1 x R2 is the relation whose 
schema contains all attributes of R1 followed by attributes of 
R2. The resulting relation R contains one tuple t which is a 
concatenation of t1 and t2, for each pair of tuples t1 and t2.  
Thus for user λ, R3 X R4 results in: 
Table 9- σ oc<= λ (R3 x R4) 
 
The join operation is the most commonly used operation to 
combine together two relations. We apply the following steps 
for join implementation: 
1. σ oc<= δ ∧ t1[OC,OO,BC,BO]=t2[OC,OO,BC,BO] (R1 x R2)7 
2. Predicate, if exists, is applied 
 
Natural join, denoted R1     R2, is a join without a predicate 
based on the equality of key values{OC,OO,BC,BO} i.e. R= 
R1            R2 = σ oc<= δ ∧ t1[OC,OO,BC,BO]=t2[OC,OO,BC,BO] (R1 x R2).  
Natural join eliminates duplicates. 
 
7
 The ordering of the operators is an optimization issue that has not been 
considered here. 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
C1 OC OO BC BO Salary C1 
λ Ron λ Ron 40 λ λ Ron λ Ron 54 λ 
λ Ron λ Ron 40 λ λ Hari         λ Hari   80 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ λ Ron λ Ron 54 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ λ Hari         λ Hari   80 λ 
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Thus, R3        R4 results in: 
Table 10- R3        R4 
OC OO BC BO Salary C1 Age C2 
α Tom       λ Hari   80 λ 39 λ 
λ Ron λ Ron 54 λ 40 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   80 λ 39 λ 
 
Thetajoin, denoted R1 Θ F R2, is a join of R1 and R2 satisfying 
predicate F i.e. R1 Θ F R2 = σ F (R1 x R2) = σ F ∧ oc<= δ ∧ 
t1[OC,OO,BC,BO]=t2[OC,OO,BC,BO] (R1 x R2). The predicate F can 
include any attribute from any relation or any comparison or 
boolean operators. Thus,   R3 Θ R3.oc ≠ R4.c1 R4 results in: 
 
Table 11- R3 Θ  R3.oc ≠ R4.c1 R4 
OC OO BC BO Salary C1 Ag
e 
C2 
α Tom       λ Hari   80 λ 39 λ 
 
In outer join tuples from a relation that do not have matching 
tuples in the second relation are also included in the result. 
Missing values Ai, Ci are set to null. There are 3 kinds of outer 
join: 
1. Right outer join, denoted R1 R2, includes all tuples 
from R2 with null values for tuples that do not exist in 
relation R1.  
R= σ oc<= δ ∧ t1[OC,OO,BC,BO]=t2[OC,OO,BC,BO] (R1 x R2) ∪ σ oc<= δ (R2) 
 
2. Left outer join, denoted R1  R2, includes all tuples 
from R1 with null values for tuples that do not exist in 
relation R2. 
R=σ oc<= δ ∧ t1[OC,OO,BC,BO]=t2[OC,OO,BC,BO] (R1 x R2) ∪ σ oc<= δ (R1) 
 
3. Full outer join includes all tuples of both relations.  
R=σ oc<= δ ∧ t1[OC,OO,BC,BO]=t2[OC,OO,BC,BO] (R1 x R2) 
 
Thus for user α, R3 full outer join R4 results in: 
Table 12- R3  full outer join R4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semijoin,  denoted R1 semijoin F R2, is a join of R1 and R2 
satisfying predicate F where the result contains only attributes 
of R1. pia(R1 semijoin F R2) =pia (σ F ∧ oc<= δ ∧ t1[OC,OO,BC,BO]=t2 
[OC,OO,BC,BO] (R1 x R2) ), where a is the set of all attributes of 
relation R1.Thus for user α, R4 Semijoin (BC=OC) R3 results in: 
Table 13 - R4 Semijoin (BC=OC) R3 
OC OO BC BO Age
 
C1 
λ Ron λ Ron 40 λ 
α Tom α Tom 35 α 
λ Hari         λ Hari   39 λ 
IV. LATTICE OPERATIONS AND MAPPING TO ROLE BASED 
ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
The MLSK model, like other multi-level security models, is 
based on the assumption of a fixed lattice of users. This 
assumption restricts the application of the model, since in any 
realistic implementation, the user set and its structure are 
bound to change over time.  
 
To ensure that the model does not compromise on any security 
aspect and that covert channels are avoided, we restrict the 
lattice manipulation operations to be carried out only by an 
administrator. This ensures that no user has access to the 
lattice and hence no user is aware of the existence of any peer 
or superior users. 
 
We allow the administrator to carry out 4 basic lattice 
manipulation operations: 
1. Add User 
2. Delete User 
3. Add Link 
4. Delete Link 
 
Later, we prove that these 4 operations are sufficient for any 
manipulation that the administrator may wish to perform on 
the lattice.  
 
The add user statement has the following general form: 
ADD USER <OC> 
AS <parent/child> OF <OC’>  
where: 
1. OC is the owner classification of the new user and 
should not already appear in the lattice as an existing 
user 
2. OC’ represents the existing user  
 
Some key points to note are: 
1. A valid value must be entered for OC’. If, not, it 
would be equivalent to the new user being added a 
new stand alone node which denotes the creation of a 
new lattice8 
2. OC cannot contain the symbol * since the use of this 
symbol is restricted for the Delete User statement as 
explained later  
Thus, 
ADD USER µ 
AS child OF αβ 
 
changes the lattice9  
 
8
 Multi-level security models do not support multiple lattices. 
9
 No data is associated with these lattices since data is relevant only to the 
users and these lattices are visible only to the administrator.  
 
OC OO BC BO Salary C1 Age C2 
α Tom       α Tom            null null 35 α 
α Tom       λ Hari   80 λ 39 λ 
λ Ron λ Ron 54 λ 40 λ 
λ Hari         λ Hari   80 λ 39 λ 
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Figure 2- Initial  Lattice 
to: 
 
Figure 3 - Lattice After Adding User 
 
The delete user statement has the following general form: 
DELETE  USER <OC> 
where OC represents the user to be deleted and should be a 
valid entry i.e. a user who is not in the lattice cannot be 
deleted.  
Some key points to note are: 
1. When deleting a user, all children of the user (if any) 
should be linked directly to all parents of the user (if 
any) and the data should be appropriately modified 
2. If deleting a user causes any user to become a stand 
alone user disconnected from the lattice, the action is 
aborted 
Thus  
DELETE  USER α 
results in: 
 
Figure 4 - Lattice After Deleting User 
 
Note that the linkage between αβ and λ has not been implicitly 
deleted, instead a direct linkage has been created to avoid loss 
of data. Further, in the data for αβ, any belief of α previously 
accepted by αβ, now has Ci values α* indicating to αβ that α 
user has been deleted from the system. 
 
The add link statement has the following general form: 
ADD LINK FOR<OC> 
AS <parent/child> OF <OC’>  
where: 
1. OC represents the user to be linked 
2. OC’ represents the parent/child user 
Some key points to note are: 
3. Both OC and OC’ should be valid entries already 
existing in the lattice i.e. a user who is not in the lattice 
cannot be linked 
4. If adding a link causes a violation of the lattice 
partial order, the action is aborted 
Thus the statement: 
ADD LINK FOR λ  
AS child OF µ 
results in: 
  
 Figure 5 - Lattice After Adding Link 
 
The delete link statement has the following general form: 
DELETE  LINK FOR <OC> 
FROM  <OC’>  
where: 
1. OC represents the user to be de-linked 
2. OC’ represents the parent/child user 
Some key points to note are: 
1. Both OC and OC’ should be valid entries directly 
linked and already existing in the lattice i.e. users who 
are not in the lattice or not directly linked in the lattice 
cannot be de-linked 
2. When deleting a linkage, all children of the current user 
(if any) should be linked to all parents of the current 
user (if any) and the data should be appropriately 
modified  
3. If deleting a linkage causes any user to become a stand 
alone user disconnected from the lattice, the action is 
aborted  
Thus 
DELETE  LINK FOR λ 
FROM  αβ 
results in: 
 
 
Figure 5 - Lattice After Deleting Link 
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These 4 operations suffice for any lattice manipulation that the 
administrator may wish to perform. Consider the example of 
the administrator wanting to move an existing user from its 
current position in the lattice to another position. This can be 
carried out by deleting the existing links between the user and 
its parent(s) and child(ren) and adding new links. 
 
Thus, if the administrator wished to move µ to become parent 
of αβ, the following 2 operations suffice: 
DELETE LINK FOR µ  
FROM αβ 
ADD LINK FOR µ 
AS parent OF αβ 
 
Figure 6 - Lattice Operations Equivalent to a Move 
 
Hence no other operation is needed for lattice manipulations.  
 
Lattice-based access control models such as ours can be 
implemented in a role-based environment by generating every 
state of the role based model from the corresponding state of 
the lattice [13]. We wished to define RBAC commands for 
each lattice operation defined by our model so that, every time 
a lattice L changes to a lattice we do not need to regenerate the 
RBAC state R’ (corresponding to L’) from scratch. We 
wanted to be able to generate R’ from R (the RBAC state 
corresponding to L) using incremental RBAC operations. 
 
Figure 7 – Mapping Lattice Based Access Control to Role Based Access 
Control 
 
However, we discovered that any lattice manipulation 
operation can require data propagation from the lowest to the 
highest level of users. This is equivalent to generating R’ from 
L’. Further, role based systems allow users to define property 
inheritances and constraints with minimal restrictions 
[SR1993].To ensure that a lattice manipulation operation does 
not result in the violation of any user defined inheritance or 
constraint, the entire system R’ needs to be validated. This 
endorses the fact that any incremental effort to generate R’ 
from R does not guarantee security and to ensure security we 
need to generate R’ from scratch using the new L’ definition. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Implementation of our model is composed of two major parts- 
the lattice implementation and query implementation.  
 
Lattice implementation was developed using AT&T’s grappa 
software package that supports lattice visualization.  Four 
operations- add user, delete user, add link and delete link are 
supported in this application.  In our implementation user 
names in lattices are specified using English alphabet to 
accommodate ease of input using a keyboard. 
 
The main objective of query implementation in this 
demonstration software was to illustrate that our relation 
model can be implemented in a non-relational environment, 
thereby giving users greater flexibility in data management. 
Therefore, only simple queries were implemented. Future 
work will include more complicated and nested queries10. 
 
This part of the application demonstrates MLSK queries 
performed on XML data. It was developed using SAX XML 
parser under Apache Software license, an open source XML-
manipulating API called JDOM and an implanted XQuery 
language free software Kweelt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Application Architecture 
 
We chose to implement our model using XML for the 
following reasons:  
1. To demonstrate the feasibility of deploying our 
MLSK model in a non-relational environment 
2. To avoid redundancy in data storage  
 
10
 Sample queries are included in  the Annexure 
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3. To provide increased flexibility in data management 
 
In the XML schema that we used, the data is divided into two 
components:  
1. Belief data 
2. Acceptance data.  
 
Belief data contains users’ beliefs while acceptance data has 
‘pointers’ to the data accepted by a specific user. Beliefs of 
individual users are specified between the tags <OC> and 
</OC>. Information about user objects, attributes and 
corresponding classification attributes is included between the 
tags <tuple> and </tuple> where the object is specified by the 
attribute OO. The id and the OO allow us to identify an object 
uniquely and therefore are the primary key in our XML 
documents. Such a nested structure allows easily identify the 
beginning and the end of individual objects within users 
beliefs and individual user beliefs within a document. 
 
Consider the following example: 
…<OC id="a"> 
- <tuple OO="800"> 
  <Name>Administration</Name>  
  <CName>a</CName>  
  <NumAgents>403</NumAgents>  
  <CNumAgents>a</CNumAgents>  
  <Location>Borer Building, MT 
Complex, Orlando, 
FL</Location>  
  <CLocation>v</CLocation>  
  </tuple> 
… </OC> 
a is a user who believes in an object whose number is 800. 
 
Acceptance schema indicates the data accepted by individual 
users. The first level tags indicate the user accepting the data. 
The second level contains tuple tags that provide the OO of 
this user belief object. The subsequent nested levels indicate 
user ids and their corresponding objects that are accepted by 
the first level user and believed to be the same as second level 
belief object OO.  
 
For example, user ‘a’ believes that object with number 800 is 
known to user ‘l’ as object with number 7800 and known to 
user ‘v’ as object with number 2770. At the same time, since 
users ‘l’ and ‘v’ form a nested structure, we can say that user 
‘l’ also believes that object with number 7800 is known to 
user ‘v’ as object with number 2770.  
 …  <OC id="a"> 
  <tuple OO="800"> 
 <OC id="l"> 
 <tuple OO="7800"> 
      <OC id="v"> 
      <tuple OO="2770"></tuple> 
           </OC> 
      </tuple> 
 </OC> 
 </tuple> 
…   </OC> 
If user ‘l’ does not accept user ‘v’s’ data while user ‘a’ 
continues to accept objects of both user ‘l’ and ‘v’, then this 
information is reflected in the acceptance schema as: 
…   <OC id="a"> 
  <tuple OO="800"> 
 <OC id="l"> 
 <tuple OO="7800"></tuple> 
 </OC> 
               <OC id="v"> 
                         <tuple OO="2770"></tuple> 
               </OC> 
 </tuple> 
…   </OC> 
 
Since acceptance of data is not mandatory, not every user 
needs to be specified in acceptance schema. Further, 
acceptance of data does not always lead to the data borrowing.  
Such an acceptance schema structure allows for quick 
identification of all objects associated with a specific belief 
object of a particular user. It also provides great flexibility in 
object manipulation.  
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This application has been developed in Java v.1.4.1 standard 
edition and all experiments were run on Pentium III with 500 
MH CPU and 512M of memory. 
 
Since there is no direct parallel for this effort, there is no 
comprehensive benchmark available for our system 
evaluation. Therefore, we evaluate the scalability of our effort 
by measuring performance time for each operation on 
different data set. 
 
Data sets based on large, medium and small lattices were 
created. Our small lattice comprises of 5 levels, 1-2 users per 
level and 1-2 objects per user. A medium lattice comprises of 
10 levels, 1-3 users per level and 1-3 objects per user and a 
large lattice comprises of 15 levels, 2-3 users per level, 3 
objects per user. For the test queries we use sets of 6, 10 and 
14 queries per operation, where each set contains equal 
number of simple (having one selection condition) and more 
complex (having 2 conditions in where clause) queries.  
 
 
Figure 9 shows a breakdown of the average execution time for 
Select statement. Execution times for queries on small and 
medium data sets are close unlike time for large lattice which 
is almost twice of time needed to execution on small lattice. 
This indicates that performance time increases considerably 
with increase in data size and a real world system will require 
optimization. 
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Figure 9: Execution Time for Select Statement 
 
VII. CONLCUSION 
 
Our work extends our MLSK model to include relational 
algebra, lattice manipulation operations and a non-relational 
implementation. These extended features eliminate some 
constraints of the earlier model and allow for easy adoption of 
the model for a real world problem.  
 
Our next steps would be to include operations that support 
querying of the user lattice. The model can also be expanded 
to include schema definition and manipulation. Our focus will 
also include query optimization.  
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